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I. INTRODUCTION
The three-bedroom, one-bath home that Robert and Patricia Castillo moved
into in Richmond could use a fresh coat of paint on the outside and does not have
1
grass on the front lawn. The couple wanted to find a home so they could more
2
easily care for their autistic son. In 2005, just before the housing market crash,
they purchased the home for $420,000, but following the market failure the value
3
plummeted to $125,000. Now, they are in a home that has lost most of its value,
yet are struggling to make high mortgage payments while trying to recover from
4
the financial crash. The national mortgage crisis that started in 2007 led to
5
significant losses on mortgage payments to many financial institutions, and
6
today many homeowners, like the Castillos, strain to make their payments.
Others risk foreclosure and walking away from the homes they purchased before
7
the bubble burst, leaving behind a wake of unpaid loans.
Cities like Richmond are now considering an innovative solution to the
housing crisis still impacting residents in its communities, like the Castillos: a
city will buy residential mortgage loans at fair market value and refinance the
loan so a homeowner can make lower monthly payments and stay in his or her
8
home. The plan is set up to give cities and third-party investors the difference
between the amount it would buy the loan for and the amount for which it would
9
refinance the loan.
Amidst the initial attempts of a few cities proposing to use eminent domain
to take over underwater mortgages, opponents have quickly launched reactions to

1. Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/in-a-shift-eminent-domain-saves-homes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[hereinafter Dewan Invokes] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 7 (2009).
6. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
7. Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners Years After Foreclosure, WASH.
POST (June 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/lenders-seek-court-actions-againsthomeowners-years-after-foreclosure/2013/06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc-11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
9. Id. Under the plan, “a home mortgaged for $400,000 is now worth $200,000. The city plans to buy the
loan for $160,000 . . . . Then the city would write down the debt to $190,000 and allow the homeowner to
refinance at the new amount . . . [t]he $30,000 difference goes to the city, the investors who put up the money to
buy the loan, closing costs and M.R.P. The homeowner would go from owing twice what the home is worth to
having $10,000 in equity.” Id.
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try to stop those proposals before they are adopted. Some of opponents’
attempts include staking out a spot near the entrance to a city council meeting to
11
sell hotdogs to entice people to listen to their point of view. Others include
drawing hard lines by refusing to offer loans in communities that allow eminent
12
domain of residential mortgages. As discussions regarding using eminent
domain on residential mortgages continue and attempts to stop it remain strong,
the issue of whether the taking satisfies a public use will be at the heart of what
to do with former homeowners who are struggling to keep their homes under
difficult financial circumstances and the investors who want their investment
13
back. As a result, cities that want to use eminent domain of mortgages will face
an obstacle of proving the act meets the “public use” requirement of the Fifth
14
Amendment.
Courts should presume a city meets the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment when it takes a residential mortgage through eminent domain and
15
gives the loan to a private, third-party lender. But, lenders can rebut the
presumption by proving that a homeowner does not qualify for that type of
assistance, the profits to the city and a private third-party investor are high
enough to raise suspicion that the taking benefits a private party over the public,
and the lack of an overall economic development plan supports a claim that the
16
taking is not for the public’s benefit.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the history of defining
“public use” under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and how that
definition has allowed government actors to take private property for the private
17
use of another. Part III discusses the public use element of city plans to use
18
eminent domain to take residential mortgages. Part IV supports a finding that a
city asserting its eminent domain rights on residential mortgages is based on a
19
valid public purpose. Part V discusses the implications of a presumption of

10. Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-california-a-long-shot-against-blight.html?_r=0
[hereinafter Dewan Eminent] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10.
14. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (stating that “a State may transfer
property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking”).
15. Infra Part VI.
16. Infra Part VI.
17. Infra Part II.
18. Infra Part III.
19. Infra Part IV.
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20

public use on both cities and lenders. Finally, Part VI discusses the use of a
21
balancing test that allows lenders to rebut the presumption of a valid public use.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution allows local governments to
seize private property as long as the government actors prove the seizure was for
22
a public use. Public use is broadly defined, and the Court expanded that
definition even further when it allowed a city to force a woman out of her home
23
for the sake of economic redevelopment. Now, cities want to take that broad
application of public use and apply it to their efforts to seize home mortgages,
24
refinance those mortgages, and give them to private third-party investors. This
25
plan purports to keep residents in their homes.
A. Midkiff and Broadening the Public Use Requirement
The government’s ability to take private property is based on the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, which states, “nor shall private property be
26
taken for public use, without just compensation.” Whether the government’s
avowed purpose satisfies the definition of public use has been at issue in the past
27
and is at issue for cities that want to take mortgages of residential homes.
In the Supreme Court case Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court
28
expanded the definition of public use in response to state legislation. In the
1960s, Hawaiian legislatures determined that a relatively few number of private
29
owners controlled almost half of non-government owned land. The Legislature
believed that concentrated ownership resulted in a skewed housing market,

20. Infra Part V.
21. Infra Part VI.
22. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984) (allowing Hawaii to essentially
force land sales to break up on oligopoly thwarting the functioning of the residential land market).
23. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473–75, 483–84 (2005).
24. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (explaining how the City of Richmond and third-party investors would
split the difference between the amount of the loan and the refinance rate given to a homeowner).
25. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954) (determining whether allowing the taking of a
department store to revitalize the area was for a public use), with Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 3, The Bank of New York Mellon v. City of Richmond, No. CV-133664-CRB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Notice] (arguing that the city will need to “state the public
purpose” to justify the taking).
28. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1984) (using an earlier decision by the
Court to declare that the Court “will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment”).
29. Id. at 232 (stating that forty-seven percent of Hawaii’s land was owned by seventy-two private
owners).

52

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
30

inflated home prices, and general damage to the public welfare. As a result, it
31
enacted legislation that essentially forced landowners to sell their property. The
landowners resisted and filed a lawsuit that alleged, among other claims, that the
32
Hawaiian law was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
33
landowners because the law was not based on a valid public purpose. The
34
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that public use is “coterminous with
35
the scope of a sovereign’s police power.” In further explaining its decision, the
Court said it would not “substitute its judgment for a legislature’s” in
determining what acts “constitute a public use” unless there was no reasonable
36
foundation for the use. The Court added that taking private property from one
owner and transferring it to a different private owner “does not condemn that
37
taking as having only a private purpose.” Instead, the Court said, “it is only the
taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public
38
Use Clause.”
Applying that reasoning to the facts of Midkiff, the Court held that the state’s
law served a legitimate public purpose because it was trying to restore normalcy
39
to the market of buying, selling, and owning land in Hawaii. In addition to
supporting the legislature’s ability to determine a valid public use, the Midkiff
Court added that a taking could still have a public purpose even if it benefited a
40
private person. As a result, the focus remains on the purpose of the taking and
41
whether it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,” rather than
42
who uses the seized property. In its conclusion, the Midkiff Court noted that it
was important that the legislation was enacted “not to benefit a particular class of
identifiable individuals but to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated
43
property ownership in Hawaii—a legitimate public purpose.”

30. Id.
31. See id. at 233–34 (detailing how the Hawaiian Legislature condemned property to provide a tax
benefit to the landowners being forced to sell their land).
32. Id. at 235.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 236 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding).
35. Id. at 240.
36. Id. at 241.
37. Id. at 243–44.
38. Id. at 244.
39. Id. at 242.
40. Id. at 243–44.
41. Id. at 241.
42. Id. at 244.
43. Id. at 245.
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B. History and Background of Kelo

44

The Supreme Court established the government’s right to take public
property for economic purposes in the landmark case Kelo v. City of New
45
46
London. In 1998, the City of New London faced blight. Acting with the city’s
authorization, and to counter the city’s apparent decline, the city, the state, a
private pharmaceutical company, and a non-profit mobilized to inject money into
a large-scale economic development plan that would reinvigorate the city’s
47
48
economy and population. The plan called for $315 million of investments and
was going to transform ninety acres into a thriving community of residences,
businesses, and recreational activities that would create jobs and a lifestyle that
49
would draw people to the area and reinvigorate the city’s tax revenue. However,
the multi-stage plan ran into problems when the city wanted to take the property
50
of homeowners who did not want to move.
Suzette Kelo and her fellow petitioners filed a lawsuit when the City of New
London, through the New London Development Corporation, stated it would take
51
the property of Kelo and others via eminent domain. When the case reached the
Supreme Court, Kelo argued against eminent domain for the purposes of
52
53
economic redevelopment. The Court, in a 5–4 decision, upheld the use of
eminent domain for an economic purpose because it “unquestionably serve[d] a
54
public purpose.” The Court reviewed its past jurisprudence to find that the
55
general public does not have to use the land to constitute a public purpose.
Public use has a broad definition that allows a court to evaluate the entirety of a
56
project’s purpose rather than evaluate it on a “piecemeal basis,” and even if
property is transferred to a private individual, it is the purpose behind the transfer

44. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 473 (stating the City was designated a “distressed municipality” and its unemployment rate
was almost twice the rate of the state and it recorded its lowest population since 1920).
47. Id.
48. Id. The state issued two bonds—a $5 million bond for planning purposes and a $10 million bond to
create a state park—as part of the plan, and pharmaceutical company Pfizer announced plans to build a $300
million research plant next to the area targeted for revitalization. Id.
49. Id. at 474–75.
50. Id. at 475.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 484 (claiming that economic development was not a public use that would satisfy the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Kelo and her fellow petitioners also highlighted and the court acknowledged
that their homes were not “blighted” and only subject to eminent domain because their residences were located
in the area of the economic development plan. Id. at 475.
53. Id. at 479.
54. Id. at 484.
55. Id. at 479–80.
56. Id. at 481 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)).
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and not the result that matters. Relying on this broad definition of public
purpose, the Kelo plurality determined that the City of New London’s project
was for a public purpose because the city wanted to increase tax revenue and
create jobs, the entirety of the project was designed to fulfill that goal, and the
58
Court’s prior case law limited its ability to review the city’s purpose.
The Kelo plurality’s broad interpretation of public use and the dissent’s rigid
59
construction of the term were offset by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which
struck a balance between the plurality’s deference to legislatures and the
60
dissent’s need for judicial review of a taking’s purpose. Justice Kennedy said it
was important to scrutinize whether a taking is for a public purpose or if the
61
public benefit is only incidental to the benefit given to a private party. He
agreed with the plurality that a bright-line rule that a taking was presumptively
invalid because it was part of an economic development plan was inappropriate
62
in a takings analysis. He explained that a bright-line rule would “prohibit a large
number of government takings that have the purpose and expected effect of
63
conferring substantial benefits on the public at large.” However, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence considered the possibility of a heightened standard of
review in takings cases in which private parties benefitted from the government
64
action. He reasoned that there may be cases when “the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption
65
(rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted.” He did not elaborate as to
when a higher standard would apply and did not believe it necessary to consider
66
in Kelo because the City of New London acted based on a public purpose. In
concluding, Kennedy stated that there was no improper purpose in the case of
Kelo even though “there may be categories of cases in which the transfers are so
suspicious, the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported benefits

57. Id. at 482. (“[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics” used to determine whether there
is a public use). Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984).
58. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84.
59. See id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the public use requirement allows a taking for a
public use and not for a private individual’s benefit).
60. See Marla E. Mansfield, Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court’s 2004-2005 Term, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 243, 288 (2005) (“Justice Kennedy twice reminded his colleagues of the availability of some substantive
due process requirements for legislation.”).
61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 492–93.
63. Id. at 492.
64. Id. at 493.
65. Id.
66. Id. Justice Kennedy agreed that the City of New London had a proper public purpose because the
taking was part of an overall plan to convey a significant benefit to the local economy and there was a sufficient
review process that supported the city’s claim that it did not enact the plan to favor one private party over
another. Id.
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are so trivial or implausible that courts should presume an impermissible private
67
purpose.”
The Court’s decision in Kelo sparked outcry among the public and
68
government officials. However, despite some states taking a statutory stance
69
against the Kelo plurality and Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, the case remains the
judicial definition of a public purpose under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
70
Amendment.
III. CITIES CLAIM PUBLIC USE SATISFIED IN USING EMINENT DOMAIN ON
MORTGAGES
Cities like Richmond that propose to use eminent domain on foreclosures
face heavy resistance from mortgage companies both in court and in the
71
legislature. The proposal to use eminent domain on residential mortgages could
serve a public purpose because it allows a city to take over an underwater
mortgage at market price and refinance at a new rate, thus lowering mortgage
72
payments for homeowners and keeping residents in their homes. Potential legal
battles facing Richmond and cities that attempt similar takings likely begin with
the disagreements between trustees and investors over what a different private
73
lender is allowed to do with a bad loan a city is trying to take over. At least one
company stated it would consider taking legal action if a plan like Richmond’s

67. Id.
68. Adam Liptak, THE NATION; Case Won on Appeal (To Public), N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2006),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E2DE133FF933A05754C0A9609C8B63&n=Top/Referen
ce/Times%20Topics/Subjects/P/Public%20Opinion (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing that the public reaction included state legislatures passing bills to counter Kelo’s holding and an
attempt to take one Supreme Court Justice’s home via eminent domain); see also John M. Broder, States
Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/
national/21domain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(reporting that three states passed bills limiting the state’s ability to use eminent domain and dozens of others
proposed similar legislation in reaction to Kelo).
69. See Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kansas City v. Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, 316 S.W.3d
418, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that the legislature enacted a statute providing landowners with
sufficient appraisals as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London).
70. See Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 30 (2011) (describing the
Second Circuit’s post-Kelo takings analysis as “extremely deferential”).
71. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10; see also James Queally, ACLU, NJ Join Fight to Protect Cities Using
Eminent Domain to Fight Foreclosure Crisis, THE STAR-LEDGER (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.nj.com/essex/
index.ssf/2014/04/aclu_nj_leaders_join_fight_to_protect_cities_using_eminent_domain_to_fight_foreclosure_c
risis.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that city officials in Irvington, New
Jersey want to use eminent domain on foreclosed mortgages and identified 199 that are eligible).
72. Alexandra M. Perry, Eminent Domain: A Solution to the Mortgage Crisis?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 181,
191–92 (2013).
73. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (explaining that in Richmond, investors requested their trustees to sue
the city to stop their plan).
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was implemented with federal support. If that were to happen, it would not be
75
the first attempt to take the city to court over its plan. In 2013, Wells Fargo
76
requested a preliminary injunction in federal court to stop Richmond’s plan. The
bank and its co-plaintiffs challenged the “public use” purpose of the city’s plan
because it financially benefits a private investor and targets individual
77
homeowners who are making their mortgage payments. As a result,
restructuring a loan leaves a homeowner with a “windfall” while the initial loan
78
backers lose money. The judge dismissed the motion because Richmond’s
proposed plan was not final and as such, the validity of the challenge remains
79
unanswered.
Cities also face opposition from mortgage groups that lobby Congress to stop
80
efforts to take mortgages by eminent domain. The House of Representatives
introduced a bill in 2013 to prevent Fannie Mae from issuing mortgages in
81
counties that use or have used eminent domain to take home mortgages. The
same bill also seeks to prohibit the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) from
securing mortgages under the National Housing Act or an FHA program in a
82
county that uses eminent domain on residential mortgages. Other efforts to stop
the use of eminent domain on mortgages have significantly diminished the
83
intended effects of at least one state law seeking to protect homeowners. These
legislative efforts may undermine the argument that using eminent domain on

74. Nick Timiraos, Freddie Mac Considers Legal Action to Block Eminent Domain Plan, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 7, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2013/08/07/freddie-mac-considers-legal-action-toblock-eminent-domain-plan/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting William
McDavid, general counsel for Freddie Mac, as saying the mortgage company “would consider taking legal
action” if Richmond took loans using eminent domain).
75. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wells Fargo Bank v. City of Richmond, No. 3:13CV-03663 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint].
76. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wells Fargo Bank v. City of Richmond, No. 3:13-CV-03663
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Bank]
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 9–10.
79. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Judgment, Wells Fargo Bank v. City of Richmond, No. 3:13-CV-03663 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter
Order] (stating the claim was not yet ripe).
80. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that one asset management group supported a bill proposed
by a Texas legislator that prohibited federal backing of loans vulnerable to eminent domain).
81. H.R. 2767, 113th Cong. § 108 (2013). Author’s note: This bill was pending as of Jan. 4, 2014.
82. H.R. 2767. Author’s note: This bill was pending as of Oct. 5, 2015. The bill’s most recent activity
shows that additional sponsors joined it in 2014, but there has been no other action. 160 Cong. Rec. 6399-02
(July 17, 2014).
83. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (explaining that the Georgia Legislature passed a law guarding against
predatory loans only for the law to be “gutted” a year later after some lenders stopped providing loans in the
state).
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mortgages serves a public purpose because history shows that the public supports
84
limiting the government’s ability to seize private property.
85
Cities and a citizens’ rights group are fighting back. In New Jersey, city
leaders in Irvington and Newark sent a joint letter with the American Civil
Liberties Union state chapter to ask the U.S. Attorney General and the FHA to
adopt an explicitly neutral policy regarding municipal use of eminent domain on
86
mortgages. Richmond’s mayor has publicly stated on more than one occasion
87
she will not stop efforts to promote the proposal despite heavy resistance.
But without public support, cities that are considering using eminent domain
to take over mortgages can find it difficult to fight for public use, especially
88
when facing intense resistance from mortgage companies. By a 6–1 vote, the
Irvington, New Jersey City Council approved a measure allowing its mayor to
draft a redevelopment ordinance that permitted the use of eminent domain of
89
90
mortgages. However, that was before the May elections. After a key
councilman retired and with the newly elected mayor opposing the use of
eminent domain on underwater mortgages, the council voted 4–2 to hold off on
91
the plan. That has not stopped the neighboring city of Newark from continuing
with an aggressive plan to rehabilitate the housing market in its city by using
92
eminent domain on mortgages if necessary.
IV. SEIZING A MORTGAGE SATISFIES THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
Cities may successfully argue that their seizure of underwater mortgages
satisfies the public use requirement given the Court’s broad interpretation of the

84. See Liptak, supra note 68 (describing that the public reaction included state legislatures passing bills
to counter Kelo’s holding and an attempt to take one Supreme Court Justice’s home via eminent domain); see
also Broder, supra note 68 (reporting that three states passed bills limiting the state’s ability to use eminent
domain and dozens of others proposed similar legislation in reaction to Kelo).
85. Queally, supra note 71.
86. Id.
87. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (quoting the mayor as saying, “[t]hey can put forward as much
pressure as they would like but I’m very committed to this program and I’m very committed to the well-being
of our neighborhoods.”); Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (quoting the mayor as saying, “I’m not trying to
minimize what we’re dealing with; it’s just like, if you’re willing to buck up against an unjust set of
circumstances, you’re going to have those attacks coming at you. And in some sense that says you’re doing
your job.”).
88. Joe Tyrrell, Tale of Two Towns: Newark, Irvington Mayors Tackle Housing Issues, NJ SPOTLIGHT
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/09/24/tale-of-two-towns-newark-irvington-mayorstackle-housing-issues/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Dewan Invokes, supra note 1
(reporting that San Bernardino dropped its plan to use eminent domain on foreclosed mortgages).
89. Tyrrell, supra note 88.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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requirement. But is that broad interpretation enough to support a city’s claim
94
when there is no economic plan to revive an area like in Kelo and Midkiff? At
least one commentator contends that there are or should be special protections
95
provided for the residential home. However, the Court has not recognized a
96
special protection for the home in takings cases. Instead, a closer look at the
jurisprudence may show that cities with plans that only benefit the individual
homeowner, and do not economically benefit the community, may fail to
97
convince a court to approve of their taking of a residential mortgage. Applying
the findings Justice Kennedy reviewed in his concurring opinion in Kelo provides
98
guidance to courts evaluating a city’s plans to seize mortgages.
99

A. Applying Kelo to Eminent Domain of Residential Mortgages
If a private lending company challenged a city’s seizure of underwater
100
mortgages, a federal court would rely on the Kelo holding. The Court supported
its holding by stating that its past decisions gave deference to local government
101
bodies in deciding what kinds of public use support a taking. In Kelo, the city
of New London wanted to take private property to revive the area’s overall
102
economy. Today, a town with many foreclosed homes could similarly argue
103
that communities with foreclosed homes suffer and using eminent domain to

93. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005) (upholding the Court’s prior
rejections of narrow test defining public use).
94. See id. at 474 (describing the City of New London’s development plan); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233
(explaining the Land Reform Act and the process instituted for the Legislature to determine if a public purpose
is served).
95. See Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of the Third
Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 142 (2012) (arguing that the protection of the
home provided for in the Third Amendment should be read into the Takings Clause).
96. Infra note 97.
97. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954) (stating that when there is a public purpose, the
government can take a private business to carry out a redevelopment plan); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (holding that legislation forcing the sale of private homes to another private individual
satisfied the public use requirement when doing so did not benefit a particular class of individuals but “attacked
certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership”); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (holding that the City’s
plans to condemn residential homes for economic development plan was a valid public use).
98. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 469.
100. Id. at 484 (holding that the government entity could take private property for economic development
because the taking was for a public purpose).
101. Id. at 483; see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (stating the Court will defer to the legislature’s decision
as to what is considered a public use).
102. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84 (stating the City wanted to implement its plan to increase tax revenue and
create new jobs).
103. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 18
(The Urban Institute 2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf
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restructure a mortgage would serve the public purpose of keeping people in their
104
homes and maintaining communities. As a result, a city could use the loose
105
standards of defining what constitutes a public use to justify taking residential
106
mortgages to protect individual homeowners. However, the public use element
is challenged on grounds that it favors different, private, third-party investors and
107
targets specific individual homeowners who can pay their mortgage bills. A
108
court can also turn to the Court’s analysis in Midkiff. There, the Court
determined that the taking of land from one private owner to force a sale to
another private owner was a public purpose, and part of the Court’s reasoning
was that the law enforcing the sale was enacted before any individual
109
beneficiaries of it were identified. The City of Richmond reportedly targets
110
both performing and non-performing loans. Whether that constitutes targeting
an individual before a plan is enacted is undecided and is an open question for a
111
court to answer.
A closer examination of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo could
112
support a city’s taking of residential mortgages. In approving the Court’s
decision in Kelo, Justice Kennedy relied on several trial court factual findings
that justified the conclusion that the City of New London had a valid public
113
purpose in condemning Ms. Kelo’s home. Those findings included testimony
from City of New London officials about the purpose and evidence of blight in
114
the city. Leaders of communities with large numbers of homeowners saddled

(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing how foreclosures lower property values
which in turn results in less tax revenue to local governments).
104. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that the City of Richmond’s purpose in using eminent
domain on foreclosed mortgages was to “prevent foreclosures and the blight of vacant properties.”); see also
Perry, supra note 72, at 204–05 (analyzing that a court would likely find that transferring mortgages by using
eminent domain would fulfill the public purpose of preventing blight).
105. See David Schultz, Economic Development and Eminent Domain After Kelo: Property Rights and
“Public Use” Under State Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 41, 46 (2006) (stating that there is a
broad definition of public use that includes an acquisition that “serves a public purpose, confers a benefit on the
public, furthers the state’s police powers, or otherwise is within a state’s legitimate governmental authority”).
106. See Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that the City of Richmond’s purpose in using eminent
domain on foreclosed mortgages was to “prevent foreclosures and the blight of vacant properties.”); see also
Queally, supra note 71 (explaining that one New Jersey city mayor wanted to use eminent domain on foreclosed
mortgages to help homeowners afford their monthly payments).
107. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 10 (claiming there is no “legitimate ‘public use’” for the city
program to seize residential mortgages).
108. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984).
109. Id. at 245.
110. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
111. See Order, supra note 79 (dismissing a claim against the City of Richmond because its city council
had not yet approved use of eminent domain on underwater mortgages).
112. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 491–92.
114. Id. at 491.
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with underwater mortgages have publically supported the use of eminent domain
115
on those mortgages because it is for the benefit of their blighted community.
These communities can also point to statistics showing the number of underwater
mortgages and foreclosed homes in their area are significant enough to make a
116
negative impact, which further justifies taking this kind of governmental action.
Therefore, a city arguing in federal court for the use of eminent domain of a
mortgage may stand up to a closer evaluation of their purpose under the Justice
117
Kennedy concurrence.
B. Protecting the Individual Homeowner is a Valid Public Use
When cities want to use eminent domain on mortgages, Justice Kennedy’s
Kelo concurrence may provide guidance and support for a court to hold that the
118
taking serves a valid public purpose. Justice Kennedy stated that if a litigant
objects to a taking on the grounds that it “impermissib[ly]” favors private parties,
a federal court should treat this objection seriously with the presumption,
119
however, that the government action aims to serve a public purpose. Opponents
of the City of Richmond’s plan contend that the taking of residential mortgages
120
unjustly favors different, private, third-party investors. But, the city can rely on
the presumption that the government action aims to serve a public purpose and
support that presumption by arguing that courts should provide individual
homeowners a special protection given the benefits of homeownership to the
121
individual and the community in which they reside.
Homeownership can provide many financial and personal benefits to the
122
individual homeowner. It also provides benefits to the greater community in
115. See Tyrrell, supra note 88 (reporting that Newark mayor Ras Baraka wants to use eminent domain
on mortgages to slow foreclosures and address vacant buildings “plaguing the city.”); Dewan Invokes, supra
note 1 (describing how the city of Richmond wants to use eminent domain to address “fraying neighborhoods
and a depleted middle class”).
116. See Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that post-recession homes in Richmond lost sixty-six
percent of their value, and sixteen percent of homeowners lost their homes in foreclosure).
117. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (explaining that a stricter review may be necessary when a taking poses a
risk of invalid favoritism to a private party).
118. Id. at 491.
119. Id.
120. Complaint, supra note 75, at 10.
121. See William M. Rohe, Shannon Van Zandt & George McCarthy, The Social Benefits and Costs of
Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research, in JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2001) (describing studies that
found a correlation between personal satisfaction and homeownership); see also Selma Hepp, Social Benefits of
Homeownership and Stable Housing, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://economist
soutlook.blogs.realtor.org/2012/03/27/social-benefits-of-homeownership-and-stable-housing/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing benefits such as better self-esteem, healthier living, and
financial wealth).
122. See Hepp, supra note 121 (extolling the virtues of homeownership).
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123

which it is established. One commentator argues that there should be special
protections for the home because, in part, the Third Amendment’s history of
protecting the home suggests that the Framers “may have intended for the
Takings Clause to provide greater protection to homes than to other types of
124
property.” Further, the political process supports an argument that the home is
125
provided special protection because in response to Kelo, many states enacted
126
laws that offered greater protection to homeowners from government takings.
Here, cities like Richmond and Newark want to help their citizens stay in their
127
homes so their communities remain vibrant and productive.
Using Justice Kennedy’s analysis of the facts in Kelo, a city that wants to use
eminent domain on mortgages can point to the fact that many of the residents
who would benefit from the program are not known when the city considers or
128
would approve a plan to use eminent domain of residential mortgages. Thus, by
cities showing that promoting individual homeownership is not
129
“impermissib[ly]” favoring a private party and providing evidence that there
should be an additional protection to individual homeowners, a court may find
130
that a government taking of a residential mortgage fulfills a public purpose.
C. Risk of Favoritism Invites Closer Scrutiny
Critics of residential mortgage takings contend there are other considerations
131
that invite closer scrutiny of the public use requirement. Justice Kennedy’s
Kelo concurrence opens the door for this argument by suggesting there may be
132
takings cases that warrant a “more stringent standard of review.”
123. See Rohe, Van Zandt & McCarthy, supra note 121, at 12 (explaining that homeowners stay in their
neighborhood longer than renters and the longevity leads to increased property values in the neighborhood).
124. See Sprankling, supra note 95, at 142 (arguing that the protection of the home provided for in the
Third Amendment should be read into the Takings Clause).
125. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005).
126. See Christopher W. Smart, Legislative and Judicial Reactions to Kelo: Eminent Domain’s
Continuing Role in Redevelopment, 22 PROB. & PROP. 60, 61 (2008) (reporting that “since 2005, some 42 states
have adopted some form of anti-Kelo legislation”).
127. See The Associated Press, Eminent Domain to Fight Foreclosures is Divisive, NJ.COM (Nov. 23,
2013, 1:54 P.M.), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/11/eminent_domain_to_fight_foreclosures_is_
divisive.html [hereinafter Eminent Domain] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting
that the mayor wants to help his struggling town); Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (reporting that Richmond wants
to use eminent domain to boost its “depleted middle class”).
128. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (stating that city planners’ lack of knowledge of other private beneficiaries
of its redevelopment plan was evidence that the taking was for a public purpose).
129. See id. at 491 (explaining that favoring a private party could be impermissible in the context of a
taking).
130. See id. (stating that evidence of government’s reason for taking fulfilled the public use requirement).
131. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 19 (arguing the eminent domain proposal transfers wealth from one
private party to another).
132. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493.
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In supporting the Court’s conclusion that the City of New London’s
economic redevelopment plan was a permissible public purpose, Justice Kennedy
relied on the factual findings and evidence presented to the trial court justifying
133
that purpose. Those findings included evidence that the city invested money in
its plan before a majority of the private beneficiaries were known, that the city
chose developers and a plan from a group of applicants, and that other, private
134
beneficiaries were still unknown after the city approved the plan. Mortgage
companies fighting a city’s use of eminent domain to take foreclosed mortgages
could use this analysis to argue that there should be a higher standard of review
in these cases because private investors in one mortgage company are being
135
favored over the private investors who originally funded the mortgage. Thus,
because the transfer is from one private investor to another, mortgage companies
may argue that the transfer of private property does not involve an economic
136
development plan aimed toward bettering the public good. To support this
claim, the companies, at least in the case of Richmond, could state that the
private beneficiary of the plan is already known before the city council approves
137
the plan, and there was no selection from a group of applicants. Therefore, a
claim that reducing mortgage rates via eminent domain serves a public purpose
of keeping people in their homes is potentially subject to a stricter standard of
review because there could be strong evidence that the taking favors a private
138
party more than creating a public benefit. However, given that the Kelo
plurality acknowledged the importance of deference to the legislature, it appears
a mortgage company may struggle to overcome broad definitions of public use
139
despite hints of favoritism.

133. Id. at 491–92.
134. Id.
135. See Brian Elzweig & Valrie Chambers, Legal and Practical Implications of the Eminent Domain of
Mortgages, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2014) (describing how investors part of Mortgage
Resolution Partners would fund city plans to lower mortgages and then receive payment).
136. See Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that Richmond City Council took a vote on a proposal
to use eminent domain but did not state it was part of an overall economic development plan); Elzweig &
Chambers, supra note 135, at 4 (arguing that the real beneficiary of a city’s use of eminent domain on
mortgages are private investors who make the funding to do so possible); see also Eminent Domain, supra note
127 (quoting a New Jersey town’s mayor as saying eminent domain of foreclosures would not be a “panacea”);
see
137. See Notice supra note 27, at 1 (naming Mortgage Resolution Partners as co-defendants with the City
of Richmond). See also Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that the mayor of Richmond heard about the
eminent domain plan from Mortgage Resolution Partners).
138. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating a higher standard may be allowed when
there is a possibility of giving an advantage to private parties); Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that
the City of Richmond’s purpose in using eminent domain on foreclosed mortgages was to “prevent foreclosures
and the blight of vacant properties.”).
139. See id. at 480 (acknowledging the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments” in takings cases).
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Justice Kennedy did not support a higher review standard in cases of
140
economic redevelopment takings. Yet, he left open the possibility of a higher
141
standard for different types of takings cases. Opponents of a city’s plan to seize
a residential mortgage would use the same fact that plans to keep individual
142
homeowners in their homes are done on a case-by-case basis as evidence that
the takings are not part of an overall economic redevelopment plan that is
143
detailed in the same way as the plan the Kelo court approved. This evidence
might raise the risk of “impermissible favoritism of private parties” that supports
a presumption that the taking is for an invalid public purpose because opponents
144
allege specific mortgages are targeted before approving the plan. Further, in the
case of Richmond, there is already an identified beneficiary that the city did not
select from a group of applicants, which was an important piece of evidence to
145
Justice Kennedy in Kelo.
Additionally, there are no special legal considerations for individual
homeowners. Supreme Court jurisprudence and a plain reading of the
Constitution appear to provide support for the claim that the takings clause
146
applies to all property. Also, in determining the just compensation prong of the
Takings Clause, the Court does not award compensation for the intangible
147
aspects of homeownership. Thus, there is a foundation for imposing a higher
standard of review in cases using eminent domain on mortgages because
homeowners do not receive special protections and some cities lack an overall
148
economic development plan.

140. Id. at 493.
141. Id.
142. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 19 (contending that the eminent domain plan “cherry-pick[s]”
specific loans with the best chance of repayment).
143. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491–92 (explaining how the city’s lack of knowledge regarding many of the
beneficiaries and selection of the primary developer from a group was evidence of a valid public purpose).
144. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 19 (contending that the eminent domain plan “cherry-pick[s]”
specific loans with the best chance of repayment).
145. See Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that Richmond mayor embraced eminent domain of
mortgages after meeting with Mortgage Resolution Partners, which would be the investment company assisting
the city in restricting the mortgages).
146. See Sprankling, supra note 95, at 120 (arguing that the language of the Takings Clause “treat[s] all
‘private property’ as equally subject to government seizure”).
147. See U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 514 (1979) (determining that there is no
compensation for the intangible value of property).
148. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating there is a possibility for a higher
standard of review in takings cases).
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D. Presumption of a Public Purpose Will Likely Prevail
Cities wanting to use eminent domain can establish the act fulfills a valid
149
public use whether or not they have a comprehensive redevelopment plan.
While there is legal support to not provide special protections to individual
150
homeowners, it is likely not enough to warrant a higher standard of review
when a city is challenged over its use of eminent domain on a residential
151
mortgage. Justice Kennedy stated only a “narrowly drawn category of takings”
would justify a presumption of invalidity, but a higher standard is not warranted
152
if the purpose is economic development. A city that does not include the taking
of a residential mortgage as a part of an overall economic development plan is
not foreclosed from taking the mortgage because Justice Kennedy did not state
153
what other purposes may or may not warrant a stricter standard of review.
While the cities may not yet have detailed plans as in Kelo, the Court does not
154
require that level of specificity. Further, the cities seek a broader purpose of
maintaining their communities and keeping residents in their homes, and this has
155
benefits that extend beyond the individual homeowner. Additionally, the plan
the Court approved in Midkiff was not as detailed as the redevelopment plan in
Kelo, nor did it have the same pieces of evidence Justice Kennedy weighed in his
156
concurring opinion. Instead, the Midkiff court focused on a broad definition of
157
public use that deferred to the local legislature. Given the Court’s history of
broadly defining public use and its deference to local governments, a federal

149. See Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (describing that the Richmond mayor wants to use eminent
domain to keep residents in their home but does not state it’s part of an overall redevelopment plan).
150. See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 514 (determining that there is no compensation for the
intangible value of property).
151. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (determining that a higher standard of review is
not required just because there is an economic purpose to a taking).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting a broad, “per se,” invalid presumption of takings
for an economic purpose).
155. See Rohe, Van Zandt & McCarthy, supra note 121, at 4 (describing studies that found a correlation
between personal satisfaction and homeownership); see also Hepp, supra note 121 (describing benefits such as
better self-esteem, healthier living, and financial wealth).
156. Compare Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1984) (describing the Act that
forced the sale of private property to tenants on the land), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491–92 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (weighing trial court testimony, documents exchanged between the parties, apparent economic
distress of the city, significant contribution of public funds before private beneficiaries selected, unknown
private beneficiaries still outstanding, and selection of a developer from a group).
157. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (determining that the Court will not use its judgment in place of the
legislature’s).
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court is more likely to reject a higher standard of review for a case of a city using
158
eminent domain on mortgages.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A PRESUMPTION FOR CITIES, HOMEOWNERS, AND LENDERS
Applying a presumption that a public purpose exists when cities elect to use
eminent domain on residential mortgages raises important questions as to
159
whether the courts have a role in this debate and whether this might have a
160
negative impact on the housing market.
A. States Should Determine a Proper Public Use
Cities seeking to use eminent domain on mortgages can claim the court’s role
161
is very limited to determine a proper public use. These cities could use court
decisions that defer to legislative authority to bolster the argument that
legislatures, not the courts, should decide the limits of a city’s use of eminent
162
domain. Further, following the Court’s decision in Kelo, more than forty states
undermined the case’s holding by passing laws that gave added protections to
163
homeowners. Thus, a city that plans to use eminent domain on mortgages may
argue in court that the opponent must comply with state law, and the court must
164
defer to its prior precedents. As a result, a presumption that a plan of seizing a
165
residential mortgage fulfills a public purpose would favor cities.

158. See id. (determining that the Court will not use its judgment in place of the legislature’s); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (stating that Congress determines how to carry out powers that are within its
authority).
159. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (declaring that once a public purpose of a project is established only
Congress can determine the means to execute it).
160. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 10, (claiming that allowing cities to use eminent domain on
foreclosed mortgages would “severely disrupt the United States mortgage industry”).
161. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (stating that only Congress can determine the means of executing a
project that serves a public purpose); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (declaring that a court will not substitute “its
judgment for the legislature’s judgment”); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90 (noting that the Court only has authority to
determine whether an act constitutes a public use under the Fifth Amendment).
162. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (stating that Congress is the only one to implement a project once it has
an established public purpose).
163. See Smart, supra note 126, at 60–61 (reporting that “since 2005, some 42 states have adopted some
form of anti-Kelo legislation.”).
164. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90 (stating that the Court’s role is limited to determining a valid public
use based on centuries of case law).
165. Infra Part VI.
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B. Taking Mortgages Could Harm the Housing Market
A presumption of validity for taking underwater mortgages does not account
166
for the loss to investors and will wreak havoc on the housing market.
Opponents also contend that allowing cities to seize mortgages will negatively
167
impact pension plans and make borrowing more costly for other homebuyers
168
and owners. In response, several lenders threatened to stop providing loans to
169
communities that approve of using eminent domain to take mortgages. Thus, a
presumption of public use could ignite backlash against communities that are
170
looking for ways to help their residents. However, the ability to rebut the
presumption allows lenders to appropriately challenge a city’s plan to seize
residential mortgages, and prior attempts indicate that these lenders are prepared
171
with evidence to potentially successfully rebut the presumption.
VI. THE CASE FOR A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A court can strike a compromise of sorts between the two sides by applying a
172
presumption that a taking of a residential mortgage fulfills a public use, which
can be rebutted with evidence why it should or should not determine the outcome
173
of a case. The presumption would assume that a local government is taking a
residential mortgage for a public use. However, balancing factors tied to the
public use requirement for lenders and investors against factors for a
municipality seeking to use eminent domain on mortgages to decide for the party
174
who has the most factors weighing in their favor could rebut the presumption.
A. Factors to Consider for Lenders and Investors
The factors a court should consider when determining whether the balance
weighs for or against a lender are: (1) the financial status of the debtor at the time
the loan was initially issued; (2) the terms of the loan; (3) the value of a home

166. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 10 (asserting that the national mortgage industry will be “severely
disrupted” if cities can take mortgages using eminent domain).
167. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10.
168. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
169. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10.
170. See id. (reporting that some lenders stopped issuing loans in Georgia because of tough lending laws
the state passed in 2012 and the laws have since been changed).
171. Infra Part VI.
172. Infra Part VI.
173. Infra Part IV.
174. See Part IV.A–B.
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nearing foreclosure; and (4) the difference the lender could receive in a
175
deficiency judgment whether or not one is possible in the jurisdiction.
In many cases of loans issued to homeowners in the time period before the
housing crash, individuals who could not afford the homes they purchased still
176
received loans. In some instances, homeowners were told they did not need to
177
meet other qualifying conditions such as making a down payment. Not
178
surprisingly, those loans did not meet prior industry standards. If a lender
issued a loan under these conditions, factors one and two would cut against them.
A city claiming it is using eminent domain on a mortgage near foreclosure can
bolster its public purpose argument because it is helping vulnerable residents
179
who signed up for loans under false conditions and on bad terms. These were
likely working residents contributing to the local economy, and now they face
180
leaving the community because they could be losing their homes. Therefore,
when a court is evaluating the lender’s argument that the taking is not for a
public purpose, it can determine that a city is taking the mortgage for a public
purpose if the lender issued a non-conforming loan to a vulnerable borrower, and
181
the city is responding by helping its community recover. If the lender issued a
182
conforming loan to a borrower in good standing, then this factor would support
the lender’s argument that the taking of a mortgage nearing foreclosure is not for
a public purpose because it supports the lender’s claim that the city is
purposefully targeting performing loans to gain a profit for an independent third183
party.

175. See infra text accompanying notes 179–81, 189–85, and 191–92.
176. Loans given to individuals with bad or questionable credit history or significant loans given to
people who did have good credit history were called subprime loans. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008).
177. Kelly, supra note 7.
178. Subprime loans are considered “very high risk” because the borrowers clearly show they cannot
repay the loan in a timely manner. Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Bd. of Governors for the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Subprime Lending: Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, 1, 9–10 (2001),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2001/bulletin-2001-6a.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
179. See Kelly, supra note 7 (reporting that one man was told he didn’t have to put down a down payment
for a condo purchase).
180. See id. (reporting local man who worked in community and enrolled his son in one of its schools had
to move after his home was foreclosed on); Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (stating that one couple “watched as
their daughter’s playmates on the block have, one by one, lost their homes.”).
181. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (discussing that communities like Richmond were targets of
predatory loan tactics and now city officials want to help by using eminent domain).
182. Conforming loans are those that meet a loan limit set annually by the federal government that is the
maximum amount at which a lender can purchase a single-family home mortgage. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
Conforming Loan Limits, http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Conforming-Loan-Limits.aspx (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
183. See Complaint supra note 75, at 10 (claiming there is no public use to the city’s “profit-driven”
plan).
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Factors three and four examine what the city and third-party investor stand to
gain to either support or negate a lender’s argument that there is no valid public
purpose for taking a mortgage. If the value of the home nearing foreclosure and
the difference the lender could receive in a deficiency judgment is a minimal
amount in comparison to the value of the home, then there is less risk of
impermissible favoritism and more support toward a program that is helping
184
residents and the community. However, these factors would weigh in favor of
the lender if there were a large gain to be made because a large gain supports a
185
lender’s claim that the taking is for profit and not a public purpose. A city using
186
this program would base its taking on the home’s fair market value.
Fair market value is also a factor used to determine whether a lender has set a
187
valid price for a home when it will be up for bid at a foreclosure auction. Fair
market value usually considers such factors as a property’s potential uses, zoning
188
attachments, the cash value of the home, and the possibility for development.
Therefore, the fair market value and how cities calculate it can either bolster or
diminish a lender’s argument that a city seizing mortgages at “steeply discounted
189
prices” to gain a profit would not support a public purpose. Or, if it is the same
price a lender is required to set, then that factor supports the implication that the
city is using valid means to determine the value of the home to help its
190
residents.
The final factor courts should consider is the difference in value between the
sale price at foreclosure and the remaining loan amount, which lenders usually
191
try to retrieve by filing for a deficiency judgment against the borrower. A court
should weigh this factor against a lender if the value of the deficiency judgment
plus the amount of interest charged is disproportionate to the current value of the

184. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (stating that the plan for taking underwater mortgages includes
“both current and delinquent loans” and doesn’t target homes with second mortgages).
185. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 9 (describing how the takings plan proposed by the City of
Richmond and a third-party investor would yield a twenty percent profit).
186. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (reporting that the City of Richmond is “offering to buy the loans
at what it considers the fair market value.”).
187. See Citicorp Real Estate Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (outlining factors to be
considered in whether a property price was set at fair market value).
188. Id.
189. Complaint, supra note 75, at 9.
190. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(a) (West 2014) (requiring that a home’s auction price be set at fair
market value).
191. A deficiency judgment is defined as “[a] judgment against a debtor for the unpaid balance of the
debt if a foreclosure sale or a sale of repossessed personal property fails to yield the full amount of the debt
due.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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home at the time the eminent domain action is filed because it underscores the
192
lender’s claims that the city’s goal is to make a profit.
B. Factors to Consider for the Borrower/Debtor and City
Courts should consider whether the borrower was knowledgeable as to the
terms of the loan in determining whether a borrower/debtor receives the benefit
193
of a government taking that restructures his or her mortgage payment. Other
factors courts should consider include: the percentage of homes underwater in the
194
city seeking to use eminent domain on foreclosed mortgages; whether the
taking is part of an overall economic development plan or addresses a crisis in
195
the community; and the impact of the percentage of underwater homes on the
196
municipality’s tax revenue for services.
Additional factors a court should consider when determining whether the
borrower was knowledgeable about the terms of their loan include a borrower’s
197
ability to secure a loan through multiple lenders and his or her income level.
These factors work in favor of borrowers because—with some assistance from
the government—lenders made it easy for many borrowers to enter into unsound
198
loan agreements in the first place. Therefore, if a city can prove this element, it
would support a city’s claim that it is helping vulnerable residents stay in their
199
homes.

192. Compare Kelly, supra note 7 (reporting that one former homeowner owed $21,000 in interest in
addition to $95,500 for the unpaid portion of his loan), with Complaint, supra note 75, at 9 (claiming that thirdparty investors would gain a twenty percent profit through an allegedly impermissible program).
193. Many subprime loans were usually given to low-income homebuyers and monitories who had
limited access to larger commercial financial institutions to secure a loan. Solomon Maman, New Tools for
Combating Unfair, Deceptive and Abusive Mortgage Practices: New Amendments to Regulation Z, 21 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 199 (2008); see also Kelly, supra note 7 (reporting that one man was shown homes he
thought he could not afford but was then told he did not have to pay a down payment).
194. One extreme example occurred in San Bernardino County where after 2006, fifty-seven percent of
residential mortgages in the county were underwater. Tad Friend, Home Economics: Can an Entrepreneur’s
Audacious Plan Fix the Mortgage Mess?, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/04/home-economics-2 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
195. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding an economic development plan
was a valid public purpose).
196. Kingsley, supra note 103, at 18 (describing how foreclosure lowers property values which in turn
results in less tax revenue to local governments).
197. Many lenders administered subprime loans to low-income homebuyers and minorities. Maman,
supra note 193, at 199.
198. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis (Oct. 24, 2008)
in 20 S.C. L. REV. 549, 550 (2009).
199. See also Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (quoting Richmond Mayor Gayle McLaughlin as saying she is
“committed to the well-being of [Richmond’s] neighborhoods.”).
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Next, the court should look at factors that weigh for or against the city. For
instance, a city may not have an economic development plan to revive the local
economy through eminent domain of foreclosures; however, balancing the other
factors may allow a court to find in favor of a city if its goal is to maintain its
200
community by keeping residents in their homes. This goal satisfies a public use
201
because keeping homeowners in their homes benefits the community. In
considering the various factors supporting or denying a city’s attempt to use
eminent domain on a foreclosed mortgage, the court should evaluate each factor
separately with an understanding that one factor can outweigh another.
C. Applying the Presumption
While the court dismissed a lawsuit filed against the City of Richmond for its
202
proposal to use eminent domain on foreclosures, the city’s efforts, along with
the efforts of many others, warrant an analysis of the proposed presumption’s
applicability to a case challenging a city’s use of eminent domain of underwater
203
mortgages. The court’s initial steps require it to balance factors in favor of or
204
against the lenders. First, the lender needs to supply the terms of the loans for
205
the mortgages in question. In Richmond, this factor likely weighs in favor of
lenders who can argue the loan terms are fair and that the debtors are capable of
paying the loans even if they are underwater; this is based on the lender’s claim
that the City of Richmond and its third-party investor, Mortgage Resolution
Partners, only target performing loans not loans in default or in danger of
206
default.
Next, a court would look at the financial status of the debtor at the time the
207
loan was issued. This factor likely weighs against the lender because in
Richmond’s case, many lenders likely issued loans to low-income
208
homeowners. Then, the court would evaluate the fair market value of a home

200. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10 (reporting that the City of Richmond sought to prevent foreclosures
and the damages those foreclosures cause).
201. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (reporting that married homeowners refused to “walk away from
[their] house in part for the sake of their son.”).
202. Order, supra note 79.
203. Timiraos, supra note 74 (quoting William McDavid, general counsel for Freddie Mac, as saying the
mortgage company “would consider taking legal action” if Richmond took loans using eminent domain).
204. Supra Part VI.A.
205. Supra Part VI.A.
206. Complaint, supra note 75, at 10–11.
207. Supra Part VI.A.
208. The median household income in Richmond between 2009 and 2013 was $54,589, which was lower
than the $61,094 median household income statewide during the same time period. Further, Richmond had 18.5
percent of its population living below the poverty line during that same period while the state averaged 15.9
percent living below the poverty line. U.S. Census Bureau, Richmond (city), California, U.S. DEP’T OF
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209

nearing foreclosure. This factor could potentially cut both ways depending on if
210
the city is using the fair market value standards required by law or if they are
setting a price that yields a large profit for them and a separate third-party
211
investor.
Finally, the court considers the amount of the deficiency judgment and
212
interest charged to the debtor in comparison to the current value of the home. In
Richmond’s case, homes bought before the housing crash in 2006 lost sixty-six
213
percent of their value. Today, the median home value in Richmond is about
214
$270,200. Therefore, this factor would likely weigh against a lender seeking to
215
recover a large deficiency and high interest rate accrual against a city that
wants to pay fair market value for the loan because the factor supports the city’s
216
argument that it wants to keep residents in their homes to help the community.
In weighing factors for and against the individual borrowers and the city, the
217
court considers first the individual borrower’s knowledge. This factor falls
either for or against the individual depending on whether the lender can show the
218
borrower had sufficient options and knowledge at the time the loan was issued.
In Richmond, it is questionable if the lender can show this given that much of the
219
city’s population was “steered into predatory loans.” However, the blanket
statement that the population was prey to bad lending practices would be refuted
220
by evidence that performing loans are targeted. Thus, if a city is helping
homeowners who actually understand the terms of their loan and payment
requirements, the city’s purpose seems less likely for a public use because it is
missing the element of addressing a community need during tough economic

COMMERCE, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/06/0660620.html [hereinafter Census] (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (last revised Dec. 4, 2014).
209. Supra Part VI.A.
210. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 1988) (requiring that a home’s auction price be set at fair
market value).
211. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 9 (stating that MRP and its investors would receive a profit up to
twenty percent).
212. See supra Part VI.A.
213. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
214. Census, supra note 208.
215. See Kelly, supra note 7 (reporting that one former homeowner owed $21,000 in interest in addition
to $95,500 for the unpaid portion of his loan).
216. See Dewan Invokes, supra note 1 (discussing the reasons for Richmond seeking to use eminent
domain to stop foreclosures).
217. Supra Part VI.B.
218. See Kelly, supra note 7 (discussing how one man was not required to make a down payment when
purchasing a condo).
219. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
220. See Complaint supra note 75, at 10 (calling the City of Richmond’s plan a “façade” because it
targets loans of homeowners who pay on a monthly basis and have a good credit).
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times and leans more toward benefiting “a particular class of identifiable
221
individuals.”
Next, the court would consider the actions of the city attempting to use
222
eminent domain on foreclosures. One factor is the percentage of homes
underwater in the community, which works with another factor of determining if
223
the community is in crisis. In Richmond, about twenty-eight percent of homes
224
were underwater, which is almost double the nineteen percent national average.
This evidence weighs in favor of allowing the city to use eminent domain on
foreclosures because a plan to address a significant problem in a community is a
viable public purpose to justify a taking of the private property of one and giving
225
it to another. Finally, a court considers the impact of the percentage of
226
underwater homes on the city’s tax revenue. In Richmond, this factor weighs in
favor of the city taking the mortgage for the public use of benefitting the
community because the municipality reported that it faces “financial stress” from
increased expenses and decreased revenue from property taxes and
227
assessments.
By balancing the factors and analyzing prior Supreme Court case law, it
appears that the City of Richmond may have enough support to win a lawsuit
against banks challenging a seizure of a private, residential, underwater
mortgage. However, that could change if lenders provide enough evidence to
228
show there is a risk of “impermissible favoritism” to a private third-party
229
investor and to individual homeowners who can pay their loans. Therefore, as
cities consider a proposal of taking a mortgage via eminent domain, it will have
to be mindful of the evidence it needs to support its claim so when a court does

221. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
222. Supra Part VI.B
223. Supra Part VI.B.
224. Dewan Eminent, supra note 10.
225. See Schultz, supra note 105, at 46 (stating that there is a broad definition of public use that includes
if the use “serves a public purpose, confers a benefit on the public, furthers the state’s police powers, or
otherwise is within a state’s legitimate governmental authority”); see also Perry, supra note 72, at 204–05
(analyzing that a court would likely find that transferring mortgages by using eminent domain would fulfill a
public purpose of preventing blight).
226. See supra Part VI.B.
227. City of Richmond, Cal., 2012-13 Tax & Revenue Anticipation Notes, Series A, 1, 20 (2012),
available at http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/9391 (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
228. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (believing a
court should seriously consider an objection that there is “impermissible favoritism to private parties”).
229. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 9–10, (claiming third-party investors will make a twenty percent
profit and cities target performing loans).
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determine that a complaint can proceed, there will be a full discussion on whether
230
the public use requirement is satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
The housing crash caused a financial crisis that still heavily impacts
231
communities across the country. Individual families like the Castillos, who
want to stay in their homes and communities, face high payments in low-value
232
homes while recovering from a tough economic collapse. Leaders in some of
those cities want to find a way to help their residents and using eminent domain
to take over underwater mortgages may just be the solution that can effectively
help residents and communities—who have watched as neighbors are forced to
233
abandon their homes and their children lose more playmates—remain whole.
Lender expectations and the need to recover their lost money is also a crucial
234
factor that helps maintain the housing market. Thus, a court faced with
deciding which side to support can be greatly aided by presuming there is a
public purpose in the taking and balancing the evidence to support that purpose
using the conditions that led to the current status of the city, homeowner, and
235
lender to determine the best solution in that case to the crisis facing both sides.
Under this analysis, there may be a way to keep the Castillos and their neighbors
236
together so they can continue to be a community.

230. See Order, supra note 79 (dismissing a case against Richmond’s attempt to use eminent domain
because the city’s plan was not yet fully developed).
231. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.; Queally, supra note 71.
234. See also Complaint, supra note 75, at 14–15 (arguing that the use of eminent domain on underwater
mortgages would have negative effects on the housing market).
235. Compare Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that presumption of invalidity is not warranted unless the risk of “impermissible favoritism is so acute” that the
presumption is not warranted), with Complaint supra note 75 (arguing that is it unconstitutional for a city to use
eminent domain on foreclosures).
236. Dewan Invokes, supra note 1.
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